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  Are farms credit constrained?  Recent research answers ‘yes’ (Bierlen and Featherstone, 
1998).  However, criticism of the methods used (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Erickson and Whited, 
2000; Gao, 2002) cast doubt on this answer.  The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) reports, 
“U.S. farms are likely to be financially stable and therefore an inability to take on more debt does 
not seem to be a concern.”  (USDA, 2003)  This paper answers this important question by 
examining the responsiveness of farm investment to shocks in exogenous cash flow.   
Several empirical papers demonstrate a relationship between farm investment and the 
availability of internal funds (Hart and Lence, 2004; Bierlen and Featherstone, 1998; Bierlen et al., 
1998).  A long-standing criticism of this line of empirical work is the endogeneity of internal funds, 
e.g., increased cash flow might simply signal “improvements in future profitability” (Poterba, 
1988).  More recently, researchers have presented alternative explanations of the “investment-cash 
flow” relationship, e.g., Abel and Eberly (2002) introduce monopoly power and Erikson and 
Whited (2000) highlight the role of measurement error. 
This paper overcomes such criticism by using exogenous agricultural subsidy changes to 
identify the causal connection between a farm’s cash flow and its investment decisions.  Using 
nationally representative, farm-level data, I reveal the strength of cash flow in determining 
investment behavior.  The nature of the data allows me to account for farm-level observable 
heterogeneity, further bolstering the finding that, similar to publicly traded corporations, the source 
of financing matters to farm investment. 
Specifically, this paper exploits the sudden, exogenous cash flow received by farmers due 
to emergency legislation in 1998.  This cash flow, uncorrelated with investment opportunity, 
provides a natural experiment with which to evaluate the “source-of-financing” hypothesis.  Using 
data from the 1997 Census of Agriculture, the 1999 Agricultural Economics and Land Ownership Preliminary—Please do not cite or distribute 
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Survey (AELOS), a follow up to the census, and the 1998 Agricultural Resource Management 
Survey (ARMS), I create an extensive dataset of farms over the relevant period.  The structure of 
the data allows me to construct the appropriate variables for the analysis and control for a rich set 
of farm-level characteristics.  
  I find that farm investment not only responds to exogenous changes in cash flow, but the 
estimated response magnitude coincides with ex-ante predictions.  Further analysis indicates that 
credit constraints are the most likely explanation for failure of the perfect capital markets, optimal 
investment theory. 
Much as the present paper does, recent empirical work in the corporate finance literature 
has established a causal connection between the level of a publicly traded firm’s investment and its 
source of financing.  Rauh (2006) demonstrated that external financing caused firms to invest less 
than they would if they could finance their investment internally (e.g., via cash flows).  Fazzari at 
al. (1988) first observed a relationship between a firm’s cash flow and it’s investment. Some  
researchers interpreted this observation as evidence of a direct relationship between financing and 
investment, while others argued that the relationship was spurious, a result of myriad other factors, 
e.g., specification error (Erikson and Whited, 2000) or unobserved confounding effects (Gomes, 
2001).  Using a regression discontinuity approach, Rauh exploited the exogenous variation in a 
firm’s pension funding requirements to demonstrate that the relationship was, in fact, causal. 
  In light of the findings presented by this paper and by Rauh (2006), an important new 
direction in the literature is investigating why the source of financing matters.  Recent literature has 
looked more carefully at the relationship between the firm and the lender.  For example, Roberts 
and Chava (2006) examine the influence of publicly traded firms’ debt covenants on liquidity and 
investment.  Likewise, this paper uses unique data from the 1999 AELOS and the 1998 ARMS Preliminary—Please do not cite or distribute 
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surveys to observe the composition of each farm’s debt portfolio in order to discern the driving 
mechanism of the observed cash-flow sensitivity. 
 
A Model of Credit Constrained Agricultural Investment  
Information asymmetries may play an important role in agricultural investment.  The vicissitudes 
of Mother Nature make it difficult for outside investors to distinguish between negative shocks and 
farmer shirking.  Under such circumstances costly state-verification models, such as those 
developed by Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985) show that the optimal contracts 
exactly resemble the contracts available to farmers, namely debt contracts with no outside equity 
financing. 
  Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) developed a simple two-period variant of the state-
verification models that can be used to illustrate a farmer’s total investment decision, looking at the 
total change in assets (ΔA), not just fixed capital.  In period 1 the farm invests internal funds, w, 
and external funds, D, i.e., ΔA = w + D.  In period 2 the firm receives a gross return of F(ΔA), 
where F is an increasing, concave function.  A wedge between the cost of internal and external 
finance can be introduced as C(D,θ) where C(.) is an increasing, convex function and θ represents 









F ΔA ( )
1+ r











  w+ DPreliminary—Please do not cite or distribute 





where γ is the incidence rate, r is the real rate of return, and τ is the “collateral rate,” i.e., the 
maximum portion of assets that can be used to secure debt.  The first constraint establishes that the 
change in assets cannot be greater than the sum of the asset appreciation due to the cash flow, the 
cash flow itself, and the external debt financing.  The second constraint integrates the notion that 
most debt financing in agriculture must be secured by collateral. 
  Using this framework and following Kaplan and Zingales (1997), one can show that the 





























 ≥ 0. 
In other words, in the face of financial frictions, investment increases with the amount of internal 
resources.  This result also gives a sense of the possible response magnitudes.  Carpenter and 
Peterson (2002) suggest that in a perfectly competitive industry the first term in brackets 
approaches one as the slope of the supply of finance schedule (C11) becomes large.  The second and 
third terms reveal that the investment response can be quite large if the constraints bind and γ and τ 
are large. 
  Figure 1 illustrates the intuition embodied in equation 4.  The flow of funds is measured 
along the horizontal axis and the vertical axis measures the rate of return.  The firm’s supply of 
finance schedule, labeled S in the figure, consists of three segments under imperfect financial 
markets.  Initially, the farm can self-finance using cash flow at a constant shadow cost R.  Once 
internal cash flow is exhausted, the farmer seeks external debt financing.  This upward sloping 
segment of the supply of funds curve reflects two things.  First, the likelihood and severity of 
financial distress increases with the farm’s debt burden, requiring farmers to pay higher interest on Preliminary—Please do not cite or distribute 
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increasingly large debt burdens.  Second, the moral hazard problem increases as debt increases; 
farmers with greater debt have greater incentives to take risks that may lead to default.  Ultimately, 
farmers reach the limit of debt financing.  Because of asymmetric information the lender requires 
collateral to secure the loans.  Here the collateral constraint is binding at some proportion, τ, of 
total assets.  The marginal revenue product of investment curve, MRPI, which has slope F11 in 
equation 4 above, illustrates the farm’s demand for financing.  The competitive nature of the 
agricultural sector ensures that this curve is relatively flat. 
  Figure 2 illustrates the effects of a positive shock to cash flow.  The horizontal segment of 
the supply curve shifts right by the amount of the cash flow shock.  Due to the capitalization effect, 
the collateral constraint shifts out by more than the cash flow shock.  The increased asset value 
consequently affects the slope of the debt-finance section; a given level of debt is less risky for the 
lender. 
  Notice the theory predicts differential cash flow response according to the asset base of the 
farm.  Farm operators who own all of the land they farm will experience the supply shift illustrated 
in figure 2.  Tenant farmers, however, will see their supply curve shift by the amount of the cash-
flow shock, but they won’t experience the leverage effect and consequent decline in the slope of 
the debt finance portion of the curve. 
Empirical Strategy 
Beginning with Fazarri, Hubbard, and Peterson (1988) a large literature has estimated variations of 










The dependent variable is the ratio of capital expenditure to beginning of period capital stock.  Qi,t-1 
is a measure of the present discounted value of profits due to capital investment, i.e., marginal Q.  Preliminary—Please do not cite or distribute 
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Market-to-book value ratios are typically employed as a measure of average Q.  CFit is cash flow 
and AI,t-1 is a measure of firm assets. 
  A standard model of optimal firm investment can be shown to be linear in marginal Q when 
the firm pays adjustment costs that are linearly homogeneous in investment and capital.  If in 
addition the production function is linearly homogeneous, marginal Q equals average Q. 
  The standard model of optimal firm investment, i.e., Q-theory, implies that the marginal 
return on investment is a sufficient statistic for firm investment.  In other words, conditional on Q, 
nothing else should matter in the investment equation.  Contrary to the predictions of Q-theory, 
most studies that estimate equation 5 find a positive, statistically significant coefficient on cash 
flow, indicating that contemporaneous cash flow influences investment.  Stratifying the analysis by 
ex ante indicators of credit constraints typically reveals that the coefficient on cash flow increases 
with the likelihood of binding credit constraints.  Researchers commonly interpret this relationship 
as being indicative of credit constraints. 
  This approach is not without criticism, however.  Cash flow is jointly determined with 
investment, making statements of causality tenuous.  Measurement error in Tobin’s Q that is 
correlated with the ex ante predictors of credit constraints can lead one to erroneously attribute the 
observed responsiveness to credit constraints.   
The strategy invoked by this paper relies on variation in exogenous cash flows, i.e., 
“decoupled” agricultural subsidies, to address these criticisms. Unlike contemporaneous cash 
flows, decoupled subsidies are unrelated to the profitability of the farm.  Decoupled agricultural 
subsidies are factor subsidies to farmland.  Farmers who own or rent subsidized land receive the 
subsidy regardless of price or production.  The subsidy amount is known and unrelated to changing 
investment opportunities.  Because decoupled subsidies are not jointly determined with investment Preliminary—Please do not cite or distribute 
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opportunities they represent exogenous variation in farmer cash flow.  Finding investment 
sensitivity to decoupled subsidies is indicative of a wedge between internal and external financing. 
  The analysis also employs a natural experiment induced by “surprise” subsidies in 1998.  
That these subsidies were a surprise is supported by the fact that farmers received their subsidy 
checks two months after legislation was introduced.  The surprise subsidy was not conditioned on 
production.  Rather, farmers who farmed subsidized land received a “bonus” equal to 50 percent of 
the subsidy already attached to that land.   
  A possible concern with this identification strategy is that the surprise subsidy represented 
more than just extra cash.  Farmers who expected the government to take a “hands off” approach 
after the 1996 Freedom to Farm bill would have learned that subsidies would in fact increase if 
prices fell. In this case, attributing cash flow sensitivity to credit constraints would be spurious if 
this information differentially affected the investment decisions of farmers who appear to be credit 
constrained.  The model in section two has sensitivity implications on multiple dimensions; the 
results are spurious if the information content of the surprise subsidy varied along those same 
dimension.  This may be very unlikely, but should be kept in mind nonetheless. 
  The empirical model in this paper augments equation 5 to include decoupled subsidies (S*), 
other agricultural subsidies (S), and a vector of beginning-of-period variables that might also 
explain investment (Xi,t-1): 
(6) 
€ 







Yit is the outcome variable of interest.  In this paper I will examine two outcome variables, total 
farm asset growth (lnAit – lnAi,t-1) and capital expenditures (Iit/Ki,t-1). 
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Few datasets contain sufficient information to effectively estimate equation 6.  Other studies have 
used data from small, self-selected (i.e., nonrandom) samples of farms that belong to a business 
association within a particular state and have operated continuously for over 15 years (Bierelen and 
Featherstone, 1998; Hart and Lence, 2004).  Conclusions drawn from such limited data are difficult 
to generalize to the entire agricultural industry. 
  In contrast, the analysis that follows uses farm-level data from a random sample of all 
agricultural producers, the 1998 Agricultural Resource Management Survey and the 1999 
Agricultural and Land Ownership Survey, matched to farm-level data from the 1997 Agricultural 
Census.  Results reported below relate primarily to 5,186 farms that were sampled in the 1998 
ARMS data and received the “long form” of the 1997 Census of Agriculture.  It is worth noting 
that there are roughly five times the number of entities in this study than the next largest study of 
firm credit constraints (in any industry).  The data used in the following analysis has been 
Winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th percentile.  Table 1 contains summary statistics. 
 
Empirical Results 
I begin by investigating the response of the exogenous cash flow shock on total agricultural 
investment, measured as the growth rate of asset values.  The assets considered in this construction 
are land, physical capital, inventories (both crop and livetock), and accounts receivable.  Table 2 
contains the results of estimating equation 6 on the full sample, using the asset growth rate as the 
dependent variable.  The top row reports the estimate of β3, the response of asset growth to an extra 
dollar of decoupled payments.  The statistically significant, positive coefficients reported in this 
row indicate the excess sensitivity of agricultural investment to cash flow shocks.   Column 1 
reports the simple augmented Q equation without any other covariates.  In this specification an Preliminary—Please do not cite or distribute 
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extra dollar of decoupled subsidy results in increased asset values of $1.21.  Accounting for county 
level unobserved heterogeneity in column 2 raises the response to $3.05.  Including county level 
fixed effects effectively reduces the sample size considerably since many counties contain only one 
farm.  Including instead detailed covariates from the 1997 Census that control for the proportion of 
revenue from 16 different groups, yields of major crops, type of farm organization, and the 
presence of irrigation results in a similarly sized effect, $2.98 in column 4.  Including both 
covariates and county fixed effects brings the coefficient, reported in column 5, to 3.47, signifying 
a nearly three and a half dollar growth in total farm assets from the marginal decoupled subsidy 
dollar.   
  Table 3 begins to explore whether credit constraints cause the observed sensitivity to cash-
flow shocks.  At this point, the analysis proceeds by stratifying the sample into groups according to 
their ex ante likelihood of facing credit constraints.  This is done in two ways.  First, columns 1-3 
report the coefficients when the sample is stratified by interest coverage ratio.  The interest 
coverage ratio is the ratio of the amount of interest payments made to the amount of cash available 
to make the interest payments.  Farms with an interest coverage ratio close to one are likely to be 
credit constrained; the estimates from this group are reported in column 1.  An interest coverage 
ratio close to zero signifies farms with the capacity to take on more debt.  This estimates for this 
group are reported in column 3.  Column 2 contains an intermediate group of farms.  The 
progression of coefficients across these three columns illustrates the potential role played by credit 
constraints.  The most likely to be constrained have a $3.71 response to cash flow, while those least 
likely to be constrained experience a $2.41 response.  Grouping farms based on another measure of 
possible credit constraints, the debt-asset ratio, reveals a less compelling picture.  Columns 4-6 
report the coefficients from most- to least-likely to be constrained.  Under this grouping the Preliminary—Please do not cite or distribute 
  11 
coefficients are nearly identical across the different groups, $3.12 for the constrained group and 
$3.64 for the unconstrained. 
  As indicated in equation 4, the degree of responsiveness is larger the greater the 
capitalization effect.  The role played by the capitalization effect can be seen when the sample is 
separated according to land tenure.  Farmers who own all of the land they farm should experience a 
much greater relaxing of the credit constraint than tenant farmers who do not own the land they 
farm.  In other words, owner/operators should experience a financing supply curve shift analogous 
to that seen in figure 2, while tenants would simply see their curve shift out by the amount of the 
subsidy without a change in the slope.  Tables 4 and 5 illustrate these effects. 
  Table 4 reports the cash-flow sensitivities of three groups of farmers:  full owners, partial 
owners, and full tenants.  Consistent with the explanation above, full owners have nearly three 
times the asset growth of tenant farmers.  Full owners’ assets grow by $9.67 for each extra dollar of 
decoupled subsidy.  Tenant’s assets grow by $3.48. 
  Table 5 provides the best evidence that credit constraints affect real agricultural investment.  
In this analysis farmers are grouped according to their likelihood of being credit constrained 
(according to the interest coverage ratio) and their land ownership characteristics.  Equation 6 is 
estimated for each of the nine resulting groups.  The theory introduced in section two predicts that 
highly credit constrained landowners should be most responsive to the surprise subsidy and the 
responsiveness should decrease as asset ownership decreases and credit constraints become less 
binding.  Ultimately, unconstrained tenant farmers should respond the least.  The coefficients in 
table 5 bear out the theory.  In response to the exogenous subsidy shock, highly constrained 
owner/operators’ assets grow by $15.38 while highly constrained tenant’s assets grow by $4.80.  
Looking down the ‘Full Owner’ column reveals that owner/operators’ responsiveness decreases as Preliminary—Please do not cite or distribute 
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credit constraints loosen; ultimately, unconstrained owner/operators’ assets grow by $4.82, about 
the same as constrained tenants.  Tenants’ responsiveness, on the other hand, remains relatively 
stable across credit constraint groups, dropping only to 3.86 for unconstrained tenants. 
Investment 
The literature generally focuses exclusively on a single component of total asset growth, namely 
investment in physical capital.  I reflect that analysis in tables 6 and 7.  Table 6 demonstrates 
relatively little change in the responsiveness of capital expenditures to cash flow shocks as 
covariates are included in the model.  Again, the coefficient on decoupled subsidies is positive and 
statistically significant in every specification, providing further evidence of a wedge between 
internal and external financing.  According the preferred specification in column 3, about 55 cents 
of the marginal subsidy dollar is invested in physical capital.     
  Table 7 explores how the positive response to cash flow shocks changes with the likelihood 
of binding credit constraints.  Unlike the results for total asset growth, the responsiveness of capital 
expenditures does not appear to be related to credit constraints.  Constrained farmers spend 45 
cents of the subsidy dollar on physical capital, while unconstrained farmers spend 63 cents.  If 
anything, unconstrained farmers are more responsive to cash flow shocks. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
A voluminous literature in corporate finance explores the relationship between investment and cash 
flow.  A concern with nearly all of this literature is the endogeneity of cash flow.  This paper 
addresses the endogeneity issue by relying on decoupled subsidies, which are predetermined and 
independent of changing investment opportunities, as exogenous cash flow.  I employ several 
unique datasets to exploit an innovation in decoupled subsidies in 1998, when decoupled subsidies Preliminary—Please do not cite or distribute 
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were surprisingly increased by fifty percent.  Using this exogenous cash flow variation and the 
traditional reduced form Q-theory approach, I estimate the responsiveness of farmers to cash flow.  
The analysis indicates overwhelmingly that a wedge exists between internal and external financing.  
According to a model I develop in the paper, owners of durable assets, such as land, should be 
much more responsive than tenant farmers if credit constraints are binding.  The empirical analysis 
bears this out, demonstrating that credit constrained owner/operators are about three times more 
responsive than tenant farmers to cash flow shocks. 
  These findings have significant policy implications.  Market failures in farm financing 
suggest a role for the government to ensure financing for the most profitable ventures, even if there 
is little collateral available.  In addition, the presence of cash-flow constraints “decoupled” 
subsidies have substantial production effects.  Such effects might jeopardize this subsidy 
instrument in the context of global trade negotiations.Preliminary—Please do not cite or distribute 
  14 
Figure 1 
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Decoupled Subsidyt 1.213 3.053 2.976 3.468
(0.388) (0.580) (0.407) (0.577)
Other Subsidiest 1.200 2.654 2.962 3.282
(0.582) (0.818) (0.589) (0.829)
Qt-1 0.398 0.396 0.392 0.405
(0.034) (0.051) (0.037) (0.052)
R
2 0.063 0.094 0.117 0.126
Obs 5186 5186 5186 5186
Covariates N N Y Y
County Effects N Y N Y
Dependent Variable: 1997-98 Growth Rate of Total Assets
Cross Sectional Regression of Total Asset Growth on Agricultural Subsidies
Notes:  See paper for detailed description of data and covariates.  Standard errors 
reported in parenthesis.Preliminary—Please do not cite or distribute 
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Dependent Variable: 1998 Growth Rate of Total Assets
Full Owner Part Owner Full Tenant
Decoupled Subsidyt 9.669 5.329 3.488
(1.915) (0.463) (0.589)
Other Subsidiest 11.320 3.990 4.664
(2.839) (0.703) (0.971)
Qt-1 0.340 0.445 0.490
(0.070) (0.050) (0.070)
R
2 0.140 0.172 0.314
Obs 1150 3349 687
Covariates Y Y Y
County Effects N N N
Cross Sectional Regression of 
Total Asset Growth on Agricultural Subsidies
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis.Preliminary—Please do not cite or distribute 
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Table 5 
 
Full Owner Part Owner Full Tenant
Decoupled Subsidyt 15.383 5.678 4.797
(2.950) (0.852) (1.301)
Other Subsidiest 9.826 3.480 5.362
(4.511) (1.188) (2.278)
Qt-1 0.399 0.360 0.511
(0.303) (0.181) (0.439)
Decoupled Subsidyt 9.348 5.037 2.308
(6.386) (0.804) (0.934)
Other Subsidiest 11.734 3.508 3.537
(8.366) (1.135) (1.758)
Qt-1 0.680 0.679 0.738
(0.142) (0.090) (0.126)
Decoupled Subsidyt 4.823 4.928 3.864
(2.683) (0.723) (0.972)
Other Subsidiest 12.679 4.401 4.537
(3.378) (1.231) (1.487)
Qt-1 0.306 0.420 0.432
(0.096) (0.070) (0.102)
Covariates Y Y Y
County Effects N N N
Notes: Constraint classification based on the interest coverage ratio.  Standard 
errors in parenthesis.
Dependent Variable: 1998 Growth Rate of Total Assets
Highly Constrained
Constrained
UnconstrainedPreliminary—Please do not cite or distribute 
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Table 6 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Decoupled Subsidyt 0.447 0.615 0.549 0.632
(0.085) (0.112) (0.089) (0.110)
Other Subsidiest 0.593 0.675 0.642 0.667
(0.129) (0.163) (0.129) (0.161)
Qt-1 0.023 0.019 0.023 0.020
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
R
2 0.133 0.156 0.161 0.178
Obs 5185 5185 5185 5186
Covariates N N Y Y
County Effects N Y N Y
Dependent Variable: 1998 Capital Expenditures
Cross Sectional Regression of Capital Expenditures on Agricultural Subsidies
Notes:  See paper for detailed description of data and covariates.  Standard errors 
reported in parenthesis.Preliminary—Please do not cite or distribute 
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Table 7 
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